Making Immigrants into Criminals: Legal Processes of Criminalization in the Post-IIRIRA Era by Abrego, Leisy J et al.
UCLA
UCLA Previously Published Works
Title
Making Immigrants into Criminals: Legal Processes of Criminalization in the Post-IIRIRA Era
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7509d5nw
Authors
Abrego, Leisy J
Coleman, Mat
Martinez, Daniel
et al.
Publication Date
2017
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
1 
 
Making Immigrants into Criminals: Legal Processes of 
Criminalization in the  Post-IIRIRA Era 
  
Leisy Abrego (University of California, Los Angeles) 
Mat Coleman (The Ohio State University) 
Daniel E. Martínez (University of Arizona) 
Cecilia Menjívar (University of Kansas) 
Jeremy Slack (The University of Texas, El Paso) 
 
2017. Journal on Migration and Human Security 5(3): 694-715 
  
Executive Summary 
 
During a post-election TV interview that aired mid-November 2016, 
then President-Elect Donald Trump claimed that there are millions 
of so-called “criminal aliens” living in the United States: “What we 
are going to do is get the people that are criminal and have criminal 
records, gang members, drug dealers, we have a lot of these people, 
probably two million, it could be even three million, we are getting 
them out of our country or we are going to incarcerate.” This claim is 
a blatant misrepresentation of the facts. A recent report by the 
Migration Policy Institute suggests that just over 800,000 (or 7 
percent) of the 11 million undocumented individuals in the United 
States have criminal records. Of this population, 300,000 individuals 
are felony offenders and 390,000 are serious misdemeanor 
offenders — tallies which exclude more than 93 percent of the 
resident undocumented population (Rosenblum 2015, 22-24). 
Moreover, the Congressional Research Service found that 140,000 
undocumented migrants — or slightly more than 1 percent of the 
undocumented population — are currently serving time in prison in 
the United States (Kandel 2016). The facts, therefore, are closer to 
what Doris Meissner, former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) Commissioner, argues: that the number of “criminal aliens” 
arrested as a percentage of all fugitive immigration cases is “modest” 
(Meissner et al. 2013, 102-03).  
 
The facts notwithstanding, President Trump’s fictional tally is 
important to consider because it conveys an intent to produce at 
least this many people who — through discourse and policy — can 
be criminalized and incarcerated or deported as “criminal aliens.” In 
this article, we critically review the literature on immigrant 
criminalization and trace the specific laws that first linked and then 
solidified the association between undocumented immigrants and 
criminality. To move beyond a legal, abstract context, we also draw 
on our quantitative and qualitative research to underscore ways 
immigrants experience criminalization in their family, school, and 
work lives.  
 
The first half of our analysis is focused on immigrant criminalization 
from the late 1980s through the Obama administration, with an 
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emphasis on immigration enforcement practices first engineered in 
the 1990s. Most significant, we argue, are the 1996 Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
and the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA). The second section of our analysis explores the social 
impacts of immigrant criminalization, as people’s experiences bring 
the consequences of immigrant criminalization most clearly into 
focus.  
 
We approach our analysis of the production of criminality of 
immigrants through the lens of legal violence (Menjivar and Abrego 
2012), a concept designed to understand the immediate and long-
term harmful effects that the immigration regime makes possible. 
Instead of narrowly focusing only on the physical injury of 
intentional acts to cause harm, this concept broadens the lens to 
include less visible sources of violence that reside in institutions and 
structures and without identifiable perpetrators or incidents to be 
tabulated. This violence comes from structures, laws, institutions, 
and practices that, similar to acts of physical violence, leave indelible 
marks on individuals and produce social suffering. In examining the 
effects of today’s ramped up immigration enforcement, we turn to 
this concept to capture the violence that this regime produces in the 
lives of immigrants. 
 
Immigrant criminalization has underpinned US immigration policy 
over the last several decades. The year 1996, in particular, was a 
signal year in the process of criminalizing immigrants. Having 20 
years to trace the connections, it becomes evident that the policies of 
1996 used the term “criminal alien” as a strategic sleight of hand. 
These laws established the concept of “criminal alienhood” that has 
slowly but purposefully redefined what it means to be unauthorized 
in the United States such that criminality and unauthorized status 
are too often considered synonymous (Ewing, Martínez, and 
Rumbaut 2015). Policies that followed in the 2000s, moreover, cast 
an increasingly wider net which continually re-determined who 
could be classified as a “criminal alien,” such that the term is now a 
mostly incoherent grab bag. Simultaneously and in contrast, the 
practices that produce “criminal aliens” are coherent insofar as they 
condition immigrant life in the United States in now predictable 
ways. This solidity allows us to turn in our conclusion to some 
thoughts about the likely future of US immigration policy and 
practice under President Trump. 
 
Research on the Criminalization of Immigrants 
 
A growing body of scholarship on the merger of criminal law and 
civil immigration law in the United States examines the 
criminalization of immigrants through a number of different 
theoretical lenses, including “crimmigration” (García Hernández 
2015; Stumpf 2006), the “criminalization of immigration” (Ewing, 
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Martínez, and Rumbaut 2015; Douglas and Sáenz 2013), and the 
“overcriminalization” of immigration (Chacón 2012). These 
approaches are conceptually and empirically rich and help to make 
sense of how immigration enforcement in the United States works. 
At the same time, we find that these approaches tend to 
underemphasize the context-specific mechanics of criminalizing 
state power in favor of broad-brush statements about the 
overarching logic of US immigration law and enforcement. We also 
note that the existing literature on immigrant criminalization is 
heavily focused on the discursive aspects of how states make 
immigrants into criminals — for example, the ways that elected 
officials speak about undocumented migration as a threat. In 
contrast, and especially in this turbulent time of extreme anti-
immigrant rhetoric and policies, we think it is imperative to clearly 
outline and specify immigrant criminalization as an actually existing 
practice, and not just a legislative or perhaps policy-based speech 
act. In focusing squarely on the practice of immigrant 
criminalization, and not just on the act of naming that characterizes 
immigrants as criminal subjects, we hope to avoid re-naturalizing 
the links between criminality and immigration (see, for instance, 
Melossi 2015). Indeed, the difficulty in much of what has been 
written academically about immigrant criminalization is that it risks 
repeating the noun-centric logic of “criminal alienhood” at the core 
of immigrant criminalization, thereby reinforcing the links between 
criminality and immigration. In this sense, our focus on practice 
highlights the engineered rather than taken-for-granted nature of 
criminal alienhood.  
  
Below, we examine the processes of criminalization in three 
contexts: the legal history that has produced the current situation, 
enforcement programs and practices at the border and interior, and 
the consequences for immigrants and their families living in the 
United States. In doing so, we extend the discussion of the 
criminalization of immigrants beyond the existing literature, on two 
basic counts. First, rather than discuss criminalization in the post-
9/11 or War on Terror context, we focus on legislative changes that 
paved the way for the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996, which we understand 
as a crucial year for the criminalization of immigration. Second, we 
document how criminalizing state power turns people and indeed 
whole communities into law enforcement objects through specific 
programs and practices, and how immigrants experience this power 
within families and outside the home. 
 
We do not suggest that individuals convicted of crimes should be 
treated less humanely (see Negrón-Gonzáles, Abrego, and Coll 
2015); however, it is worth noting that a sizeable proportion of 
deported immigrants labeled “criminal aliens” have not been 
convicted of a crime, or have only committed relatively minor 
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criminal violations, such as traffic infractions or drug offenses. For 
example, from 2010 to 2013, only 3 percent of the 2.6 million 
immigrants ICE encountered through the Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP) had been convicted of “a violent crime or a crime which the 
FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] classifies as serious” (Cantor, 
Noferi, and Martínez 2015, 2).1 And nearly 83 percent of individuals 
removed through CAP during the same period either had no criminal 
conviction (27.5 percent) or had been convicted of what the FBI 
describes as nonviolent, non-serious offenses (55.4 percent) (Cantor, 
Noferi, and Martínez 2015). Even among those whom ICE classifies 
as “Level 1” priority offenders, nearly 64 percent had been convicted 
of a non-serious or nonviolent offense.2 CAP’s wide net has ensnared 
hundreds of thousands of immigrants, but their criminal status 
remains very much in doubt. 
 
Legal Background: The 1996 Laws and Beyond 
  
IIRIRA is an important starting point for understanding how millions 
of undocumented immigrants were reclassified as deportable and/or 
inadmissible through criminal law provisions newly built into the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. The law also curtailed immigrants’ 
rights of due process on the basis that immigration control is a civil, 
or administrative, legal power not subject to robust challenge in the 
courts (Coleman 2007; 2012). However, IIRIRA was not the first law 
that criminalized immigrants; instead, it was the culmination of a 
series of legislative actions that started in the 1980s and continued 
throughout the early and mid-1990s (Inda 2013; Macias-Rojas 
2016).  
  
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) 
criminalized the hiring of undocumented workers and increased the 
resources of the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
to patrol the border (Inda 2013). IRCA also contained a provision 
requiring the US Attorney General to deport noncitizens convicted of 
removable offenses as quickly as possible. This provision set in 
motion the practice of targeting immigrants convicted of crimes and 
expanded the mechanisms for policing immigrants. Later laws, such 
as the 1990 Immigration Act, further expanded the list of deportable 
offenses and eliminated various forms of relief from deportation, 
such as eligibility for voluntary departure, asylum, and deportation 
stays.  
  
 
1 CAP is an ICE-based umbrella program that includes several key initiatives 
aimed at arresting, detaining, and removing immigrants whom ICE prioritizes, 
and based on supporting enforcement through the use of biometric and 
biographic information in shared databases. For more information, see 
https://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program.  
2 See Rosenblum and McCabe (2014) for more evidence of similar patterns 
since 2003. 
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However, 1996 was arguably the most important year, legislatively, 
in terms of the criminalization of immigration. A number of 
important laws were passed that year dealing with crime and 
immigration. The two most important laws were the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act, signed on April 24, 1996, and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 
passed several months later. Together the laws significantly altered 
the definition of aggravated felony — a category of offenses dating 
back to the late 1980s which warrant deportation and/or 
inadmissibility, and which apply only to immigrants. The aggravated 
felony charge would undergo a significant expansion via the 1996 
laws. By the close of that year, offenses that qualified as an 
“aggravated felony” would encompass a range of misdemeanors and 
minor offenses, crimes which are neither aggravated nor felonious 
— such as prostitution, undocumented entry after removal, drug 
addiction, shoplifting, failure to appear in court, filing a false tax 
return, and generally any crime warranting a sentence of one year or 
more. In addition, the laws restricted due process opportunities for 
certain classes of individuals in removal proceedings (e.g., exemption 
from various stays of deportation, as well as from applying for 
asylum) in an effort to speed up the deportation process. The 1996 
laws also included provisions to enlist local law enforcement 
agencies in the enforcement of immigration law (Menjívar and 
Kanstroom 2014). The most important provision was the §287(g) 
program, which we examine below, in addition to the more recent 
Secure Communities program.3   
 
On January 25th, 2017, Trump signed two immigration-related 
executive orders (EOs) titled “Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements”4 and “Enhancing Public Safety in the 
Interior of the United States.”5 The EOs are intended to escalate and 
intensify immigrant criminalization along the US-Mexico border and 
in the US interior. The “Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements” EO reinstitutes and expands the 
§287(g) program, allowing local law enforcement agents in certain 
western and southwestern states to enforce immigration law, as 
originally outlined in section 287(g) of 1996 IIRIRA, for which the 
program was named (DHS 2017a). It allows for sheriffs and police 
departments, as well as state-level policing agencies — to investigate 
immigration cases, make immigration-related arrests, and among 
 
3 Secure Communities is a federal program established under the Obama 
administration to allow more communication between local authorities, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) agencies. For more information about Secure Communities, 
see https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities. 
4 Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 
13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).  
5 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 
13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 
(Jan. 25, 2017). 
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other things, take custody of immigrants on the basis of both 
criminal and civil immigration violations. The EO also expands the 
use of expedited removals in the border region, calls for an 
additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents, mandates the detention of 
immigrants apprehended for unlawful entry, and prioritizes criminal 
prosecutions for immigration offenses committed at the border (DHS 
2017a). Similarly, the “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the 
United States” EO terminates the 2014 Priority Enforcement 
Program, which shielded approximately 87 percent of the 
unauthorized population from removal (Rosenblum 2015), restores 
the Secure Communities program, and authorizes the hiring of an 
additional 10,000 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
agents (DHS 2017b). Together, these EOs effectively criminalize all 
unauthorized immigrants present within the United States by 
deeming them priorities for removal while simultaneously 
expanding the immigration enforcement apparatus. Under the 
current presidential administration, the United States has essentially 
regressed to the early days of the Secure Communities program, 
which was characterized as having high levels of collateral damage 
and whereby an unauthorized immigrant’s chance encounter with a 
local law enforcement agency could result in criminalization and 
removal from the United States. 
 
The recent EOs signed by Trump have generally been understood — 
especially in the media — as an about-face for US immigration policy 
and practice. However, although certainly the rhetoric around 
undocumented migration has been ramped up since President 
Trump’s inauguration, many of the policies that the new 
administration has endorsed follow from the trajectory of 
criminalization sketched out above. As noted, the EOs scaled back 
some of the limited protections enacted in the last years of the 
Obama administration, and reemphasized the importance of using 
police as immigration agents, specifically through the §287(g) and 
Secure Communities programs. Moreover, the administration’s plan 
to pressure sanctuary localities and states by withholding federal 
block grants can be traced, at least partly, to language in IIRIRA.  
 
This brief overview of the legal and legislative history underpinning 
the criminalization of immigration suggests that the latter is not a 
state of legal exception or legal backwardness (Schuck 1984), but 
instead a systematic legal violence, that is, a strategy coded into law 
and which uses legal language that not only permits various forms of 
violence against immigrants, but one that also makes abuses possible 
and acceptable (Menjívar and Abrego 2012). As Menjívar and Abrego 
(ibid.) note, the convergence of immigration law and criminal law 
has resulted in negative consequences for immigrants and their 
family members by impacting their everyday lives as well as their 
long-term incorporation into US society, affecting in particular 
people’s interactions with social institutions such as family, work, 
and schools. From this perspective, the criminalization of 
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immigrants itself constitutes a form of legal violence “because it is 
embedded in legal practices, sanctioned, actively implemented 
through formal procedures, and legitimated — and consequently 
seen as ‘normal’ and natural because it ‘is the law’” (ibid., 1386). The 
next sections move beyond an exclusively legal approach to explore 
the lived experiences of criminalization. These practices take place 
inside enforcement institutions (e.g., federal courtrooms, prisons, 
detention centers, etc.) and within social institutions such as the 
family, places of employment, and in dealings with bureaucracies, 
among others. 
  
Data Sources 
  
The empirical evidence guiding our analyses stem from several 
research projects. We draw extensively on our research on the 
everyday aspects and impacts of immigration enforcement in the US-
Mexico border region (Martínez and Slack 2013; Slack et al. 2013; 
2015) and in the US interior (Abrego 2008; 2011; Coleman and 
Stuesse 2016; Menjívar 2013; 2016; Menjívar and Abrego 2009; 
2012; Stuesse and Coleman 2014). To examine the criminalization of 
immigrants near the US-Mexico border, we draw on data collected 
through the first two waves of the Migrant Border Crossing Study 
(MBCS) (N = 415; N = 1,109), which consist of post-deportation 
surveys of repatriated Mexican migrants in five cities along Mexico’s 
northern border and in Mexico City administered between 2007 and 
2012 (see Martínez and Slack 2013; Slack et al. 2013; 2015; Martínez 
et al. 2017). Qualitative research projects in Los Angeles, Phoenix, 
Raleigh-Durham, and Atlanta with Latino migrants of various legal 
statuses allow us to uncover the everyday consequences of 
immigration policies (see Abrego forthcoming; Menjívar and Abrego 
2012). Findings from this body of work provide greater insight into 
how IIRIRA and other related legislation have resulted in the 
criminalization of immigrants beyond a legal, abstract context. 
  
 Criminalization along the US-Mexico Border 
  
Every day thousands of people arrive in Mexican border cities, 
deported after long bus rides to these unfamiliar zones. Many have 
accumulated notable US experience, while others are relatively 
recent border crossers. According to data collected through the 
second wave of the Migrant Border Crossing Study, the typical 
repatriated Mexican migrant had spent a median of 6.5 years living 
and working in the United States, and nearly 27 percent of 
respondents had lived in the country for a decade or longer. Others 
have only just survived the desert crossing; around 15 percent were 
first-time border crossers who did not successfully reach their 
desired US destination on their most recent crossing attempt (see 
Slack et al. 2013; 2015). People apprehended within 100 kilometers 
of the border for the first time are generally formally removed or 
returned to Mexico relatively quickly, while those apprehended in 
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the interior of the United States often spend weeks, months, or even 
years in detention facilities or prisons before being released to the 
streets of unfamiliar Mexican border cities. Criminalization, and the 
complex processes that lead to removal, manifest themselves in 
various ways. In the past, it was generally considered easy to live 
and work inside the United States once migrants successfully 
crossed the border, meaning that only those who were 
“misbehaving” (i.e., violating criminal law) were removed. Although 
this has changed with mass removal, the stigma associating 
“misbehavior” with deportation remains (see Albicker and Velasco 
2016; Brotherton and Barrios 2011). When combined with the 
vulnerability to forms of violence such as kidnapping that many 
migrants experience upon deportation (Slack 2016), the fact that 
one-in-four migrants surveyed had important identifying documents 
taken away and not returned (Martínez, Slack, and Heyman 2013), as 
well as the difficulty of finding work in Mexico, it is not surprising 
that many decide to cross again. Only 23 percent of MBCS 
respondents indicated that they would never cross the border again. 
Similarly, there are also high rates of remigration from northern 
Central American countries. These migrants will face considerable 
physical dangers of navigating remote and treacherous terrain, as 
well as intensified efforts to criminalize and incarcerate them 
through programs such as Operation Streamline and other zero-
tolerance policies aimed at prosecuting unauthorized border 
crossers. 
  
Operation Streamline and Zero-Tolerance Policies 
  
Each time deportees attempt to cross the border and are 
apprehended by US authorities, the punishment for unlawful entry 
attempts increases. The principal drivers of this multiplier effect are 
Operation Streamline as well as “fast-track” federal court 
proceedings that systematically criminalize recent border crossers 
by charging and convicting them of “illegal entry”6 or “illegal 
reentry.”7 Currently three of the Border Patrol’s nine sectors practice 
Operation Streamline — Tucson, Del Rio, and Laredo. Operation 
Streamline can best be described as a federal program carried out in 
federal district courts that systematically charges and convicts for 
federal immigration crimes up to 70 recent border crossers en masse 
on a daily basis. 
  
Due to recent decreases in unauthorized migration and Border 
Patrol apprehensions, the Yuma, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley 
sectors have discontinued Operation Streamline (OIG 2015). 
Nevertheless, recent border crossers caught in these sectors can also 
be prosecuted in federal court through individual “fast-track” 
proceedings. Fast-track sentencing programs effectively “allow a 
 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1994).  
7 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994).  
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federal prosecutor to offer a below-Guidelines sentence in exchange 
for a defendant’s prompt guilty plea and waiver of certain pretrial 
and post-conviction rights” (Gorman 2010, 479). Although fast-track 
sentencing has likely reduced sentence lengths associated with 
criminal immigration cases, it has also allowed district courts to 
process more cases and secure more guilty pleas. This drastically 
increases the total number of “criminal aliens.” Any future contact by 
these individuals with law enforcement will result in much longer 
sentences. 
  
Typically, in both Operation Streamline and fast-track proceedings, 
people without criminal records or a history of formal removals are 
convicted of “illegal entry,” given time served, and immediately 
deported to Mexico.8 However, they do receive a misdemeanor 
immigration conviction, and should they be apprehended again upon 
trying to enter the United States, they risk being charged with “illegal 
reentry.” Depending on prior convictions, penalties range from a fine 
and a three-month sentence to a maximum of 20 years in prison, 
although the latter is rarely, if ever, given.9 Regardless of whether 
they were convicted of “illegal entry” or “illegal reentry,” 15 percent 
of MBCS respondents processed through Operation Streamline 
stated that they would cross the border again within the next week 
following their most recent deportation, while 47 percent indicated 
that it was possible that they would cross again sometime in the 
future. In these cases, individuals must avoid encounters with US 
officials or risk subsequent incarceration. 
  
Operation Streamline has drawn heavy criticism from immigrant 
rights activists and academics because it greatly contributes to 
immigration criminal convictions in federal courts. Prior to 
Operation Streamline, the vast majority of people apprehended on 
the US southern border were given a Voluntary Return, an 
administrative violation that carried no criminal charge. By 
expanding the use of criminal remedies, Operation Streamline has 
raised the stakes of apprehension. In 1992, only 1,753 individuals 
were convicted of federal criminal immigration offenses, by 2012, 
this number had increased thirteen-fold to 23,250 (Light, Lopez, and 
Gonzalez-Barrera 2014).  In fiscal year 2011, immigration crimes 
were the most common federal crimes (29,717 cases), surpassing 
drug crimes for the first time (USSC 2016b).  The consequences are 
severe and ongoing. Once convicted, subsequent interactions with 
law enforcement and the court system will almost certainly result in 
a prison sentence.  
 
 
8 While there are parallels with other national origin groups, MBCS data only 
includes Mexican deportees. 
9 Current sentencing guidelines for illegal reentry have recently been amended 
(USSC 2016a). 
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Moreover, the prevalence of other forms of removal, such as 
expedited removal which count as a formal removal but do not 
require review by a judge, as well as the generally confusing nature 
of immigration proceedings, further complicate people’s 
understanding of how their removals might affect them in the future. 
  
Furthermore, unauthorized migrants processed through Operation 
Streamline also experience forms of social criminalization, especially 
those who had never been tried and convicted in a formal court 
setting. Because immigrants prosecuted through the program are 
typically held in short-term detention facilities or federal prisons, 
and are shackled at the hands, waist, and feet, many report being 
treated as serious, violent, or chronic offenders. Some even began to 
internalize these labels. For example, an older, more experienced 
migrant from Michoacán, Mexico, Benjamín, stated “I felt bad when it 
happened (the court proceeding) . . . that has never happened to me, 
I have never been chained up like that . . . now they treat you like an 
animal” (Martínez and Slack 2013, 11). Javier, a young man from 
Chiapas, Mexico, expressed a similar sentiment, “We all went in a big 
group in front of the judge . . . they put the chains on us really tight . . 
. the whole time there they made me feel like I killed someone” 
(ibid.). This dehumanizing experience feels especially grave for 
people convicted in a formal court setting, leading some to 
internalize the negative labels as “criminal alien.” In the midst of 
broader social criminalization of immigrants, especially under 
President Trump’s rhetoric and executive actions, the consequences 
for immigrants are likely to be dire. 
  
Criminalization in Detention 
  
Unauthorized migrants also experience criminalization when they 
are sent to long-term detention or prison. Many migrants convicted 
of federal immigration crimes express fear and insecurity while 
being incarcerated alongside other more serious offenders. For 
instance, Mercedes expressed concern about her time in detention 
by stating “. . . there is a lot of violence, drugs and weapons inside . . . 
people smoke weed there openly . . . someone even got stabbed right 
before I left” (Martínez and Slack 2013, 13). But the consequences of 
long-term detention extend much further (for instance, see Ryo 
2016). Many are exposed for the first time to illicit social networks, 
including prison gangs and drug trafficking organizations. Octavio, a 
19-year-old from Chiapas, Mexico, notes “[t]here are more Sureños 
(a Mexican/Mexican-American gang) in jail than any other group. 
They protect us because we are all ‘paisanos’ [countrymen]. You 
have to join with them and they make sure no one touches you” 
(Martinez and Slack 2013, 12-13). With social and economic 
pressures mounting to provide for one’s family or to be reunited 
with loved ones, we found that some detainees explore opportunities 
offered through these new social networks (e.g., human smuggling or 
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drug smuggling), which could lead to further criminalization and 
stigmatization (Martinez and Slack 2013). 
  
Criminalization through Interior Enforcement 
  
To reiterate, IIRIRA is best understood not as a watershed event 
with respect to the criminalization of immigration but rather as a 
significant ratcheting up of punitive aspects of US immigration law 
then already in place. However, the 1996 law did inaugurate new 
practices related to the criminalization of immigration.  
 
Prior to IIRIRA, with the exception of the mid-1950s when more than 
a million Mexican nationals (and American citizens) were rounded 
up with assistance from non-federal authorities, immigration 
enforcement was understood as a strictly federal power operative 
principally at the US-Mexico and US-Canada borders. Indeed, there 
was a widespread legal and practical consensus among government 
and legal officials that immigration enforcement was an exclusively 
federal authority. As a result, even immediately subsequent to the 
passage of IIRIRA, well over 90 percent of deportation cases 
originated with the Border Patrol in California, Arizona, New Mexico, 
and Texas (INS 1999, 209-10, Tables 59 and 60). 
 
Written into IIRIRA, the §287(g) program emerged as a legally 
straightforward way to deputize state and local authorities to 
enforce immigration law (Valdez, Coleman, and Akbar 2017). 
Although initially very few localities expressed interest in §287(g), 
later the practice took shape in the form of “street” and “jail” 
programs; the former gives police the power to ask about 
immigration status during routine policing, whereas the latter’s 
check for status was incorporated into the jail intake process. 
 
Given the prominent place that the §287(g) program occupied in 
discussions of homeland security after 9/11, it is important to note 
that the program has had a relatively narrow reach. By 2010, the 
peak year for §287(g) operations, there were but 70 programs in 
effect across the country, and by 2012, the program had been scaled 
back to some 30 core agencies. This said, a very large number of 
individuals have been identified as deportable as a result of §287(g) 
― some 400,000 as of 2016 (ICE 2016). It is also important to stay 
focused on the larger policing landscape to see how §287 (g) helped 
spawn arguably a much more significant role for state and local law 
enforcement in federal immigration enforcement efforts. The key 
program here is the Secure Communities program, inaugurated in 
2008. Secure Communities is a “§287(g) lite,” which operates strictly 
as part of the jail intake process, but like §287(g), greatly increases 
the chances that people who encounter state and local law 
enforcement on an everyday basis will have their immigration status 
checked. Importantly, the reach of Secure Communities is much 
larger. By 2012, Secure Communities was extended nationwide to all 
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3,100 county sheriff’s offices in the country, and by the time Secure 
Communities was shelved in 2014, the program had identified an 
astounding 2.4 million people as deportable (ICE 2015). 
 
The link between §287(g) and the criminalization of immigration is 
not merely about state and local police helping to deport individuals 
arrested and convicted on serious criminal grounds. Rather, §287(g) 
criminalizes immigrants by leading to the deportation of individuals 
on a wide variety of misdemeanor as well as civil immigration 
grounds, and not on serious criminal grounds.  The program also 
attaches additional consequences to police-civilian interactions for 
communities of color across the United States, with respect to their 
already routinized contact with both state and local authorities. The 
hyper-policing of communities of color is compounded by the fact 
that even when no criminal charges are brought, individuals can be 
detained for suspected immigration violations and even removed.  
 
On the one hand, despite executive orders and memoranda directing 
authorities to focus only on serious felony offenders, both the 
§287(g) and Secure Communities programs have not focused 
narrowly on individuals arrested and convicted on serious criminal 
grounds. For instance, of the global number of individuals detained 
and deported under Secure Communities between 2009 and 2015, 
33 percent (or 135,000 cases) concern so-called “level one” 
offenders ― that is, cases involving serious felony crimes. The 
remainder of convicted individuals ― some 50 percent of all cases ― 
fall into categories of individuals who were not supposed to get 
deported through the program, including “level two” offenders (for 
example, misdemeanor-level drug and property offenses with less 
than a year of jail time imposed or served) and “level three” 
offenders (for example, basic traffic offenses and various other 
minor infractions). Another 18 percent of deportees under Secure 
Communities are considered noncriminal. Indeed, together “level 
three” offenders and noncriminal cases constitute nearly half of all 
deportations processed under the program. The data on §287(g) ― 
which is not readily available except through federal records 
requests ― suggests a similar pattern, although more skewed 
towards non-serious and ultimately noncriminal cases. For example, 
published research on §287(g) shows that the program typically 
works by stopping suspected immigration violators on the road, 
while driving, for basic traffic offenses (Stuesse and Coleman 2014; 
Coleman and Kocher 2011; Coleman and Stuesse 2016; Coleman 
2012). 
 
A second aspect in which programs such as §287(g) and Secure 
Communities (which were later rolled into the Criminal Alien 
Program, or CAP) relate to the criminalization of immigration 
involves “social control” of immigration. By this term we mean the 
ways that the attachment of new immigration consequences to a pre-
existing landscape of police-civilian contacts results in newly 
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disproportionate risks for communities of color, such that 
undocumented immigrants face the threat of deportation as a result 
of basic noncriminal activities related to work and social 
reproduction (Coleman and Stuesse 2014; Coleman and Stuesse 
2016; Stuesse and Coleman 2014). From this standpoint, 
criminalization is based on the active presumption that immigrant 
communities are criminal enclaves and as such somehow legitimate 
objects of disproportionate policing. Immigrants, therefore, run 
significant risks when they are in public due to the likelihood of a 
routine encounter with a police officer, which may result in an 
immigration query (Menjívar 2013). Criminalization also refers to 
the knock-on effects of this process, as undocumented communities 
are driven underground, out of fear that being public will increase 
the chances of being deported. In short, the context created through 
these programs heightens fear, insecurity, and unpredictability 
among people in vulnerable legal statuses. The following section 
outlines, in a series of vignettes, the struggles people face in different 
public and private contexts while living in the shadow of removal. 
 
The Consequences of Criminalization in Immigrants’ Lives 
Outside of the Home 
  
Education 
  
Criminalization is evident in the experiences of immigrants, their 
relatives, and communities, within the home and as they interact 
with central social institutions in their everyday lives. For young 
undocumented immigrants, the structural challenges that arise from 
criminalization powerfully shape their experiences with education 
and with the labor market. When they learn that their 
undocumented status will block them from opportunities for higher 
education, many young people struggle to stay motivated. Eighteen-
year-old David, for example, had stopped attending school early in 
his junior year when he felt constricted by the lack of options due to 
his undocumented status. Despite his mother’s pleas to stay and 
finish high school, he got a job at a warehouse, moving packaged 
seafood eight hours per day, six days per week, making only $8 per 
hour. He hated his mind-numbing job but could not find motivation 
to pursue other goals. 
  
Employment 
  
As they enter the workplace, young undocumented immigrants 
struggle with the harsh realities of illegality that make them 
especially vulnerable. Sisters Flor and Fabiola, arrived in the United 
States from Oaxaca, Mexico at the ages of three and five, respectively. 
They excelled in school.  When they were old enough to work, they 
wished to help their single mother, Fara, so they worked at the 
swapmeet where employers do not request social security numbers. 
Working conditions were harsh.  They were paid $45 daily for 9- or 
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10-hour days.  On most days, they got only one 15-minute break, 
which they had to forgo if customers happened to have questions 
about the merchandise at that time. Worst of all, their employer was 
verbally abusive. Under these working conditions, the sisters did not 
earn enough to notably improve the family’s financial situation. 
Instead, they toiled for hours, during time that they would have 
preferred to be studying or better using their language and 
intellectual skills in other jobs. 
  
Licenses and Dealing with Bureaucracies  
  
Twenty-four-year-old Eva is Salvadoran and a college graduate. She 
describes the stress her undocumented father experiences when he 
drives: 
  
My dad has been stopped twice and both times they have 
taken his car. I know he has a lot of trauma because of that . . . 
. He just had an accident last month and he was in a really 
bad accident, like the car is just gone. When I got there, the 
first thing he told me was, “the police is going to come and I 
don’t know what they are going to say.” I was crying . . . you 
feel so powerless . . . You just had this huge accident. It 
could’ve been worse and the first thing he was thinking was, 
they are going to ask me for my license . . . 
  
Eva, who was a Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) 
recipient, had also driven without a license for years.10 Although she 
received an official driver’s license through DACA, she continued to 
act in ways that were permeated with fear she had learned: 
  
[D]riving, you learn a lot of things, like you see a cone up 
ahead like, “Hey, what’s that? Let me turn here.” You see a 
light up ahead and all these things that you automatically 
switch on when you are driving without a license and I still 
do it. Like this month, I was still doing it and [my partner] 
was like, “Hey, you have a license now. Relax.” I would be 
like, “What’s that cone over there? Do you see a retén 
[sobriety checkpoint]?” She’s like, “You have a license.” I’m 
like, “oh, yeah,” but you still feel like, I shouldn’t go through 
there. I’m going to turn here, because you have internalized it 
for so many years. 
  
 
10 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is a program that President 
Obama established in June 2012 through executive action. It grants a subset of 
1.5 generation undocumented immigrants access to a work permit, state-issued 
identification, and makes them low priority for deportation. For more 
information about DACA, see 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca.  
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Similarly, there are numerous stories of people arriving late to 
school, work, and other important appointments because their 
journeys required them to deviate from direct routes to avoid 
checkpoints and police officers. 
  
Internalized fear similarly applies to licenses to practice an 
occupation, which can have far reaching negative effects for a person 
who is denied such benefits. DACA recipients were especially 
vulnerable in states that did not recognize DACA as a legal status and 
thus refused to issue these recipients licenses. A young DACA 
recipient in Phoenix enrolled in an 18-month vocational program to 
become a respiratory technician in lieu of the medical career she had 
dreamed about. After her family had spent a considerable sum of 
money for her to attend a for-profit school to obtain her training, the 
Arizona licensing board informed her that she was ineligible because 
Arizona did not recognize her status as legal. In tears, she noted, “I 
have been left in debt and without a job. Now I have to go back to 
working at the restaurant [where she worked with her mother] even 
though I now have an education. All that effort for nothing.” 
  
Beyond fear, anxiety, and strategies to avoid situations that can risk 
detention,11 temporary and uncertain statuses such as DACA or 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) present multiple everyday life 
challenges for those who hold them (Abrego and Lakhani 2015; 
Menjívar 2011). For instance, while DACA and TPS holders have the 
benefit of a work permit and a stay of deportation provided they 
meet other requirements, including a clean criminal record, their 
immigration statuses are not always understood in bureaucracies. 
Bureaucrats and employers tend to be more used to the black and 
white classification of documented and undocumented, and are 
familiar with “green cards” but not with temporary statuses 
(Menjívar 2017). Thus, immigrants who live in temporary statuses 
often face blocked access to employment or to a service to which 
they rightfully have access because officials or employers do not 
understand their status. For instance, a Honduran TPS holder who 
fell into a coma in a Phoenix hospital was nearly deported, in 
comatose state, because the hospital personnel could not understand 
her status and assumed she was undocumented. No other healthcare 
facility would accept her as a patient either, due to her “financial and 
complicated immigration status” (Kiefer 2008). Her family had to 
hire an immigration lawyer to explain to hospital administrators that 
the woman was “documented” in the country and not deportable 
even when she could not produce a “green card.” 
  
 
11 DACA recipients have protections from deportation if they are caught in a 
workplace raid, for instance, but with the recent change in administration in 
Washington, DC, it is unclear whether these protections will continue and if so, 
in what form and for how long. 
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Today’s enforcement context, which overwhelmingly targets Latinos, 
conflates Latinos, an undocumented immigrant status, and 
criminalization, and therefore even US-born Latinos may suffer 
negative consequences in the form of discriminatory treatment, 
denial of services, and infringement of their rights. 
  
The Consequences of Criminalization in Immigrants’ Lives 
within the Family 
  
Inequalities across Siblings with Different Statuses 
  
Hector is a 23-year-old community college student and a worker at a 
community organization. His parents migrated from Mexico to Los 
Angeles leaving behind him and his brother, who were a baby and a 
toddler, respectively. When the parents got to the United States, they 
had one more child. It took the family nine years to gather the 
financial resources to reunite the family. Although they tried to avoid 
treating the children differently, the legal status distinctions became 
more evident as they got older. One summer, US-born Heidi had an 
opportunity to visit family in another state. Hector and his brother 
wanted to go on this trip, as well, but they were not allowed. They 
were confused about the unequal treatment: 
  
So my dad explained to us, “You guys are different. Even 
though you go to the same school and do the same thing, you 
guys are different. You cannot go to places that she can go. 
You can’t do what she can do.” And the way he explained it, 
he was really messed up in a way, but it was the most honest 
way to say it. Pretty much nos dijo [he said], “Ella nació aquí y 
tú no naciste aquí. Tú no tienes los mismos derechos.” [She was 
born here and you were not. You don’t have the same rights.] 
I perfectly understood, but it was messed up. 
  
Hardship for US Citizen Children in Mixed-Status Families 
  
Twenty-one-year-old Cesar is a US citizen by birth. Both of his 
parents and his older brother were undocumented throughout his 
childhood. At the time of the interview, Cesar’s parents had both 
been able to legalize their status and his brother, Camilo, had 
obtained DACA. Reflecting on his experiences as a US citizen in this 
family, Cesar shares: 
  
I always lived with that same fear of everything, as if I were 
the target. I never felt immune to what happens to 
immigrants . . . because we are a close family . . . I never felt 
completely like a citizen until now, now that nothing and 
nobody can kick them out . . . As a child, I’d be in the car with 
my father and we’d see the police and I felt the same fear he 
felt. We’d be in the car and my father drove perfectly so that 
no one would stop him. 
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Even without verbal cues, parents’ body language can communicate 
fear to their children. As evident in Cesar’s reflections, 
undocumented status and the fear of deportation and family 
separation is felt palpably by all members of a family, even those 
who are not directly targeted by immigration laws. 
  
While families may try to compensate for the fear and instability 
associated with their status, the consequences are pervasive and 
long-lasting. Twenty-year-old Nayeli who grew up with an 
undocumented father and a US citizen mother understood early on 
that her father was vulnerable and she must keep their secret. 
Reflecting on why this was difficult, she expressed, “It’s hard for me 
to even admit that my father is undocumented. I’ve kept it a secret 
for so long, and I feel like it’s my secret and I don’t want to tell people 
about it. It’s the way I internalize it. We do it to protect my dad.” She 
shared that she had difficulty telling even close friends, making it 
difficult to develop close relationships in other realms of her life. 
  
Inability to Reunite with Family 
  
A major negative consequence of the enforcement regime for 
immigrants today is family separation, which infringes on the 
fundamental human right to live with and have a family. Through 
detention and deportation, in conjunction with family reunification 
laws, immigrant families are fundamentally altered in composition 
and dynamics. Enforcement practices separate and restructure 
families by removing members already in the United States, creating 
single-parent households or leaving children without a parent or an 
adult without a spouse. At the same time, in a twist of irony, family 
reunification laws in the context of bars to readmission, contribute 
to maintaining families separated, leading to a reorganization of 
families, adjustment of expectations, and changes in roles and power 
dynamics. In the case of immigrants in temporary statuses, they are 
barred by law from petitioning for family members, which in 
practice contributes to institutionalizing family separations 
(Enchautegui and Menjívar 2015). Members of a mixed-status family 
in Phoenix have only witnessed their family in El Salvador change — 
births, marriages, deaths — through photos because in 16 years of 
TPS status they have been “stuck” in the United States and unable to 
take part in person of any of those moments that redefine their 
family life. 
  
Discussion and Conclusion 
  
We have outlined here only a few of the specific mechanisms of 
criminalization and their impacts on people’s lives. Our analysis 
emphasizes that the census-like counts of “criminal aliens” obfuscate 
the active process of criminalization that underpins US immigration 
policy. Our work, therefore, makes visible the processes of 
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lawmaking and enforcement practices that produce the notion of 
“criminal aliens.” By connecting programs such as Operation 
Streamline that exponentially increase the number of people who fall 
into the “criminal” category, with interior enforcement programs 
such as §287(g), Secure Communities, and the Criminal Alien 
Program, it clearly demonstrates how people are located, labeled, 
and removed by agents of the state. These programs in turn have 
distinct impacts in terms of day-to-day mobility, as many people are 
unable to drive to and from work or school. Families become 
disposable units to the monolithic criminal label as people with 
tenuous legal status, such as DACA, must constantly negotiate their 
removal or the removal of a family member for an increasingly 
subjective list of mostly benign infractions. 
  
At the time of authorship, President Trump’s regime has quickly 
made good on his anti-immigrant campaign promises and there are 
important indications that the United States is entering a new phase 
of hypercriminalization (see Chishti and Bolter 2017). The executive 
orders of January 25, 2017 will largely alter the immigration 
enforcement landscape and increase immigrant criminalization. At 
the beginning of the Trump administration, arrests on civil 
immigration charges increased by 38 percent compared to the same 
time frame one year earlier (Duara 2017). Furthermore, the §287(g) 
and Secure Communities programs, both shelved during the Obama 
administration, have been revived through the executive orders, 
which perversely make no mention of the tense legal debates over 
these programs as well as the Department of Justice lawsuits, and 
other civil rights lawsuits, brought against prominent §287(g) 
agencies in North Carolina and Arizona. In this rapidly changing and 
dynamic context, in which recent legal histories are getting quickly 
forgotten, we urge scholars to remain focused not just on the big 
picture of criminalization but, we think more importantly, on 
carefully tracing the mechanisms and programs used to locate, 
arrest, and prosecute immigrants under the umbrella of 
criminalization, as well as the direct impact criminalization has on 
people while in the United States and post-deportation in their 
countries of origin. This means understanding which policies have 
been accelerated through the same mechanisms discussed here, and 
which are new. This also entails a keen focus on the continuities and 
discontinuities of US immigration enforcement across multiple 
administrations, from Reagan through Obama, and in particular on a 
greater understanding of the role of the Obama administration both 
in eroding migrants’ rights and providing new protections, 
sometimes both, simultaneously. 
  
One example of this was the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), 
which went into effect on July 1, 2015 to increase the number of 
people who would potentially receive relief from deportation. The 
new PEP redefined how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
would allocate its detention and deportation resources. It allowed 
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DHS supervisors and officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion to 
not remove certain people even if they fell within one of the 
“enforcement priority categories” (Rosenblum 2015, p.1). Perhaps 
most important, the new changes in prosecutorial discretion made 
“it unlikely that unauthorized immigrants who would qualify for 
DACA or DAPA [Deferred Action for Parents of Americans] [would] 
be deported” (Rosenblum 2015, 3). Moreover, Rosenblum (ibid.) 
estimated that nearly 87 percent of the 11 million unauthorized 
immigrants who were residing in the United States when PEP was 
enacted would have fallen outside of the enforcement priorities. 
However, the enforcement priorities focused heavily on recent 
arrivals, particularly border crossers, amplifying the impact of 
border enforcement programs in the criminalization of immigrants.  
  
The new executive actions effectively terminated PEP, returning us 
to the previous system whereupon all immigrants with questionable 
status are arrested, criminalized, and removed. Because PEP was 
relatively low profile, as opposed to DACA, there has been little 
outcry about its removal. These changes that are occurring behind 
the scenes and often with little fanfare must also garner the attention 
of scholars and policymakers. Perhaps most damaging of all has been 
the attacks on visa holders and legal permanent residents, with 
100,000 visas revoked as a result of Trump’s Muslim ban (Jouvenal, 
Weiner, and Marimow 2017). It is important to note that some of the 
more extreme criminalization elements of the EOs, such as the 
provision that would charge the parents of unaccompanied minors 
for human smuggling as well as the infamous “Muslim ban,” have 
either been held up in court or have not been fully enacted at the 
time of writing. Regardless of whether or not the EOs stand up in 
court, they have a chilling effect, one that is similar to, but much 
greater than the social stigmas and stress described in this article.  
 
The new EOs could indirectly accomplish what H.R. 4437,12 the so-
called “Sensenbrenner Bill,” attempted to do — to make criminals 
out of unauthorized immigrants. The Sensenbrenner Bill, which 
passed the US House of Representatives but failed in the US Senate, 
included several provisions that would have criminalized “violations 
of federal immigration law, including illegal presence” (NCSL 2017, 
paragraph 2). The bill also would have given local law enforcement 
agencies the authority to enforce federal immigration law (NCSL 
2017). The implications of the Sensenbrenner Bill were quite 
straightforward and understood by immigrants, immigrant rights 
activists, and their allies. This resulted in mass mobilization and 
protests, culminating in the 2006 immigration marches throughout 
the country, ultimately leading to the bill’s demise in the US Senate 
and serving as a catalyst for the DREAM movement. 
 
 
12 Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005).  
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Although Trump’s recent EOs do not explicitly criminalize 
unauthorized presence, they do strip away the few protections 
unauthorized immigrants gained during the Obama administration, 
prioritize unauthorized immigrants for removal, and expand the 
immigration enforcement apparatus by re-instituting and expanding 
§ 287(g) and the Secure Communities programs as well as by 
increasing Border Patrol and ICE staffing. 
 
We acknowledge that there are many steps in the path to becoming a 
“criminal alien” under the new EOs, but this process is in fact playing 
out on a daily basis throughout the United States, albeit slowly. The 
slow pace and hidden nature of this criminalization process may 
partially explain why Trump’s recent EOs did not mobilize protests 
to the same extent as the Sensenbrenner Bill. It is likely that the 
immediate and long-term implications of the EOs are difficult for the 
public to comprehend given their complexities, which may help 
explain why people have not mobilized to the same extent as they 
did a decade ago. In other words, the blurring of immigration law, 
criminal law, and deportation obfuscates the criminalization process 
inherent within the EOs. To us, this makes Trump’s EOs much more 
ominous, daunting, and dangerous than the Sensenbrenner Bill. 
 
Understanding the full scope of this impact will require a critical 
examination of all associations between immigration and crime, 
including terminology such as “crimmigration” that can serve to 
normalize the linkages between human mobility and crime. This will 
be paramount in the weeks, months, and years ahead. 
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